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 This research project conducts an analysis of the current situation in Crimea and 
attempts to contribute to the literature around a possible solution. Done so with the help 
of geopolitical analysis, the history of the region of Crimea is examined in-depth in an 
attempt to shed light on strategies for a resolution and provide background information. 
Geopolitical analysis as a form of study is then briefly explained and its relevancy for 
looking at global events and predicting outcomes explained. Next, three possible 
strategies for a solution are then presented and their viability analyzed through a 
geopolitical lens. These three strategies are: unilateral pressure and sanctions, multilateral 
incorporation, and a shared sovereignty approach. This project concludes by arguing that 
the best way to proceed towards a solution in Crimea is through a synthesis of all three 
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 The 2014 Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation is one of the most 
important events in modern international relations. Not just for the international 
precedents and laws that it broke, but for the ways in which it unfolded. As a zone that is 
claimed in right by both Ukraine and Russia, while physically claimed solely by Russia, 
Crimea serves as an extremely interesting case study to analyze for potential solutions. 
The importance of a resolution in this case is seen in the truly international response to 
the conflict in the region, and because of Russia’s position on the world stage. As the 
global political landscape continues to shift from unipolar to multipolar, and from west to 
east, the position of a vital military power like Russia will be crucial. The stability of both 
the domestic region of Crimea as well as the international arena is greatly influenced by 
Russia, so it is necessary for the sake of peace and stability that relations with global 
powers are good. Currently, the situation in Crimea has caused international outcry, 
which underscores the importance of a solution being worked towards soon. While it may 
not be that simple, these ideas beg the question: how can the contestation of Crimea be 
solved in the most stable and peaceful way possible? 
 In order to provide an informed view of potential solutions, this study first 
examines the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations and how it eventually led to the 2014 
annexation. This historical background is extremely vital when looking at the modern 
perceptions of Russia and Ukraine by their own citizens as well as how they view one 
another. If one wants to propose a resolution, these perceptions must be taken into 
consideration. On a similar note, this project attempts to explain actions of various actors 
using the tools of geopolitics. Geopolitics is a form of study that looks at political events 
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in a broader way by evaluating the importance of factors such as geography, economics, 
history, and others that are often forgot about in monocausal academic theories. Viewing 
the case of Crimea in this way can provide a much more holistic view of the issue, which 
in turn helps inform a possible solution. This study then examines three key proposed 
resolution strategies: unilateral action, multilateral incorporation, and shared sovereignty. 
After illustrating positive and negative aspects of each, this project concludes by arguing 
that the best route towards a solution is a synthesis of all three, but with an emphasis on 
multilateral incorporation. Based on the tools of geopolitical analysis, this is the most 
realistic strategy for a resolution in Crimea and would lead to the most peace and 
stability. The expected outcome of this study is to provide the reader with a more in-
depth understanding of contemporary Russian-Ukrainian relations through the lens of 















 Much of the English language literature surrounding Crimea, Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, and Russian foreign policy is highly critical of Russia. This makes sense as the 
west, namely the United States, has historically been hostile towards Russia. The 
correctness of those with this view can be debated about at length, but a single 
perspective is not beneficial for the sake of quality research. To attempt to balance the 
western bias against Russia, this study sought out Russian and eastern European authors 
who would have a different perspective. This helped to an extent, but overall the most 
important aspect for diversity of opinion was finding sources with differing viewpoints, 
regardless of the nationality of the author. 
 Overall, the literature found for this study served to illustrate the most popular 
sentiments about how Crimea could be solved. These made their way into the paper as 
the three ideas for a solution (unilateral, multilateral, and shared sovereignty). This 
served as an important guiding tool for understanding what a realistic solution to the 
conflict might look like. Along these lines, the sources highlighting specific international 
law were greatly important for learning about the legality of the annexation. In addition, 
the journals detailing the struggles of the Crimean Tatars and Ukraine’s idea of 
nationalism were vital for understanding many of the underlying geopolitical issues that 








 The research for this study was conducted mainly through a synthesis of primary 
and secondary sources. The primary sources consisted of 5 in-person interviews with 
various experts on the topic throughout Europe. These experts ranged from employees at 
think tanks and government institutions to tenured professors at universities. The only 
thing that tied them together was their experience on the topic at hand, and they served to 
provide a wide array of perspectives that were crucial for my research. The backbone of 
the research for this paper was made up of scholarly and peer-reviewed journals. Topics 
varied from historical analyses, to arguments for a solution, to more objective recounts of 
an event. All of the sources cited and referenced played a part in the conclusions of this 
research. 
 The methods used to collect the data were mainly qualitative, with a few 
quantitative graphs from the sources being used to support arguments or shed light on an 
issue. For the topic of ethical considerations, the anonymity of interviewees was 
respected if they requested it. Also, care was taken to not include any information or 
quotes that jeopardize the job or safety of anyone involved, as many of the conflicts 









Analysis: Section I 
“Between Russia and the West” 
As a nation, Ukraine has always had a complicated identity. Only an independent 
state since 1991, Ukrainian history is filled with ethnic and nationalistic ambiguities 
fraught with intervention from their eastern neighbors. Knowledge of this complicated 
national identity is vital for understanding how Crimea and conflicts in eastern Ukraine 
can be solved, so it is first necessary to go back to the old history that led to the creation 
of modern Ukraine. 
Tracing back to the origin of Ukraine, even its name is a great example of the 
confusing national identity of Ukrainians. It stems from the Russian word “okraina”, 
which means periphery as seen from Moscow, and appeared only for the first time near 
the end of the nineteenth century (Rykwin, 2014). Even this small linguistic etymology 
serves to show the complicated nature of Ukraine’s identity, and has influenced attitudes 
towards Russia since the nation’s inception. Another problem that exists at the heart of 
Ukrainian identity is the wildly varied history of the lands that belong to modern Ukraine. 
For example, Ukraine is made up of a multitude of different ethnic groups and peoples. 
The west of the country has Austro-Hungarian and Polish roots and is often regarded as 
the most nationalistic part of the country, “Russian is rarely spoken there” (Rykwin, 
2014, pg. 120). The political capital of Ukraine, Kiev, is the historical capital of the 
Kievan Rus’ and vital to the nation’s self-identity. Another example of such a place is 
Crimea itself, which has historically been occupied by the Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group 
native to the surrounding area. The Tatars see themselves as the only people truly native 
to the region, and even the word for Crimea comes from the Tatar word “krym”, which 
 
10 
means rock fortress (Wydra, 2003). After being a protectorate of the Ottoman empire for 
a time, Crimea was conquered by Russia during the 18th century and existed as an 
autonomous republic of Crimean Tatars within Russia all the way into the time of the 
Soviet Union. It then stayed as part of Russia until Nikita Khrushchev offered the 
peninsula to Ukraine in 1954 as a token of appreciation for the 300th anniversary of 
Ukrainian union with Russia (Rykwin, 2014). 
The complicated background of Crimea’s ownership and Ukraine’s identity has 
made the current situation all the more understandable. Their history of a wide variety of 
nations and peoples with vastly different cultures being amalgamated into one nation has 
led to an extremely complex sense of nationalism. This is felt all throughout Ukraine, but 
especially so in Crimea. Another crucial piece of the history of Crimea is the expulsion of 
the Crimean Tatars by Joseph Stalin. Deported en masse by Stalin, and suspected by him 
as German collaborators, the Crimean Tatars made up a sizable portion of the Ukrainian 
population. Not allowed to return to Crimea until 1956, the Tatars have been slowly 
attempting to reintegrate with the help of the Ukrainian government. In modern times 
Crimean Tatars make up only about 10% of the population of Crimea, with ethnic 
Ukrainians and Russians making up the rest (Chase, 1995). This abrupt loss of a major 
ethnic group in Crimea brought about by Stalin’s policies has only further muddied the 
ethnic identity of the region and gives another interesting perspective to its modern 
dynamics. All of these factors in conjunction has caused Ukraine and Crimea to exist in a 
confusing state “between Russia and the West” (Rykwin, 2014) with its identity 
uncertain. With the foundations of the conception of Ukraine and Crimea addressed, it is 
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then important to shift to the crucial period that acts as a stepping to stone from the 
ancient to the modern notions of Crimea: The Soviet era. 
Soviet Relations & the 21st Century 
The Soviet era was an extremely important time for Crimea, and it underpins 
many of the policies and justifications given for the 2014 annexation of the region by 
Russia. In order to understand the contemporary period of Russian-Ukrainian relations, it 
is vital to learn about this period. The first important point to note is regarding the way in 
which Crimea and Ukraine existed within the Soviet Union. During this time, 
“designations of both borders and regional status within the former Soviet Union was 
largely arbitrary and, where it was not arbitrary, it was deliberately designed to dilute the 
power of local populations” (Chase, 1995, pg. 222). This sort of jumbling of ethnic and 
national identities into the Soviet sphere caused a confusion of identity in many countries 
in the eastern bloc, especially Ukraine. Also notable in this period was the briefly 
mentioned above rise of the Stalinist line of thinking, which led to the deportation of the 
indigenous Crimean Tatars from their homeland. This thinking was extremely pervasive 
during the time of the Soviet Union and has become very difficult to root out in the 
region even to this day.  
Another important development during the Soviet period was Russia’s promotion 
of the Russkii Mir, or Russian World, in Ukraine. The goal of this investment was to 
provide “a group identity to Russian speakers and peoples who associate with Russian 
culture and language” (Kuzio, 2015, pg. 159). This promotion of Russian culture and 
identity was crucial to creating the divided ethnic and cultural climate that exists within 
modern Ukraine. In addition to this, other Russian policies during the Soviet period also 
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contributed to hostility between the nations. Most notably, the 1933 artificial famine in 
the Soviet Union which most Ukrainians view as a genocide and are extremely bitter 
towards (Kuzio, 2015). This is another example of one of the many policies that has led 
to hostilities from both countries and goes to show how the 2014 annexation was 
anything but a random fluke. Around this time period Ukraine was also briefly occupied 
by the Nazis beginning in 1941. During this time the Ukrainians were initially even 
friendly towards the Germans due to their distaste for Stalin’s policies in the 20’s and 
30’s (Rykwin, 2014). This showcases a tangible, historical example of the dissonance 
between Russia and Ukraine and how often this difference of opinion manifested itself 
politically. 
This leads to the discussion of an oft-overlooked aspect of Ukraine’s self-
conception. Simply, the way in which the country won its independence. Having not ever 
been a country with a uniform identity that answered to no one, Ukraine as a nation was 
historically always subject to a greater power. Whether this was the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empire, or more recently with the Soviet Union, Ukraine has almost always 
existed as a subject state. When its independence was finally won in 1991, it happened 
not because of a violent revolution or overthrow of its masters like many countries which 
gained their independence in the 20th century. But rather, it was thrusted upon them due 
to “the deterioration of government infrastructure in Moscow and the sapping of the 
strength of the will to rule” (Rykwin, 2014, pg. 122), alongside the other factors such as 
gross mismanagement and economic failure that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
‘Winning’ their independence in this way was very important to the national psyche of 
Ukraine. Instead of being a united front following their independence, Ukraine was a 
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muddied mix of ethnic and national identities due to its diverse history and had never 
truly ruled itself in the modern sense. These factors together left Ukraine and Crimea 
vulnerable to intervention in the post-Soviet era and provide a clearer image to how the 
lead-up to the 2014 annexation of Crimea happened.  
Lead-up to the 2014 Annexation 
From the time of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 to the annexation of Crimea in 
2014, a great number of crucial policies and actions took place. When taken with the 
background knowledge of the history of the region, they provide a holistic view of the 
crisis in Crimea and eastern Ukraine that can hopefully inform how to approach a 
solution. 
The first example of such a development was the talk of retaking Crimea for 
Russia that began as early as the 1990’s. Even though Ukraine had very recently gained 
its independence, conservative politicians in Russia were already ready to “argue for the 
forceful restoration of Crimea to Russian control” (Hopf, 2016, pg. 230). However, at the 
time, this was not the commonly held belief within Russia. Centrist discourse seemed to 
be prevailing for a time, riding on the pro-democratic wave felt throughout Europe after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, by the early 2000’s this was already beginning to 
fade as Russian conservatism began to rise again. One of the catalysts that has been 
argued to be the reason for this was the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty (ABM) in 2001 and subsequent NATO expansion eastward. Marc Finaud, 
head of Arms Proliferation at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), describes 
this treaty as “a means of deterring second-strike capability”. Many viewed the signing of 
this treaty as a sign of future cooperation between the United States and Russia in the 
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post-Soviet era, and Finaud also argues that the withdrawal from this treaty contributed to 
the modern climate of mistrust that exists between the nations. Those with rose-colored 
glasses hoping for an extended union between Russia and the west soon realized that 
these factors “demonstrated that an alliance with the United States was impossible” and 
that “Russians who expected a sense of shared vulnerability were quickly disabused of 
this possibility” (Hopf, 2016, pg. 232). This was in line with the idea that NATO-Russia 
relations were built on the false premise that “Russia was on a path toward sharing and 
integrating Western values fundamental to the post–Cold War Alliance transformation” 
(François, 2012, pg. 5). It has been argued that these actions which caused Russia to feel 
spurned by the West were the main reason discourse in Russia shifted from the Centrist 
view of collaboration with the West to manage global affairs, to the Conservative view of 
working with powers like China to balance the United States and the West (Hopf, 2016). 
When seen from this perspective, Russia’s attempts to level the playing field and project 
influence begin to make more sense.  
Another vital development that happened shortly after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union was attempts by the newly created Russian Federation to keep former 
Soviet countries in line with political and institutional tools. The backbone of this tactic 
was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which was meant to check the 
power of foreign-policy decisions in the former Soviet states. This is best seen in Article 
One of the CIS Charter, which stated “participating states will not enter into military 
alliances or participate in any groupings of states, nor in actions directed against another 
participating state” (Götz, 2016, pg. 307). Tensions quickly rose as Ukraine only agreed 
to the deal after making a multitude of amendments and refusing to allow Russia basing 
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rights on the Crimean Peninsula. Russia would not budge, however, and by 1997 
agreements were in place for Russia to lease a group of naval facilities on Crimea in 
return for Russia reducing Ukraine’s crippling energy debt by roughly $500 million USD 
(Götz, 2016). Although seen as a minor victory for Russia at the time, this was a massive 
step for their power projection in Crimea that would eventually pave the way for the 
ruthlessly efficient annexation of the peninsula in 2014. 
As relations between Ukraine, Russia, and the West continued to evolve into the 
2000’s, so too did Russia’s tactics for influencing the region. Using cutting-edge 
technological advancements, the bulk of these tactics were about Russia exerting soft 
power techniques in the region. Most notably, a digital disinformation campaign meant to 
sow discord and divide the people of Ukraine. Thinking such as this is in line with 
historical Russian tactics of ‘plausible deniability’ that seeks to not seem responsible for 
a usually illegal action and “where the result is to influence decision-making in a 
direction favourable or at least not harmful to the Kremlin” (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018, 
pg. 484). This was mainly used in the aftermath of the 2014 annexation in order to 
attempt to control the narrative (Golovchenko, et. al, 2018), but it was also seen in the 
lead up to the annexation. Dialogue in this manner goes back to the views of Russian 
ultranationalists in the 1990’s, who attempted to argue that Ukraine has no right to even 
exist as a sovereign state (Kuße, 2018). Although admittedly an extreme example, it still 
goes to show how contentious and belittling the relationship between the two nations is. 
Something even as simple as the mere existence of the country of Ukraine is questioned 




Arguably the most important event that happened in region during this time was 
the Euromaidan protests of 2013, and it was truly then that things quickly spiraled into 
the situation that exists today. Briefly, although it could easily be multiple papers on its 
own, Euromaidan needs to be explained in order to understand contemporary ideas of 
nationalism and identity in Ukraine. In November of 2013, then Ukrainian President 
Viktor Yanukovych announced Ukraine would not be signing an association agreement 
with the EU that had been negotiated for years and was seen as a steppingstone to full-
fledged EU membership. This move was wildly unpopular with the people of Ukraine 
who desperately wanted closer ties with Europe rather than Russia, and it did not help 
public sentiment that the decision not to sign came with a $15 billion loan from Russia 
(Biersack & O’Lear, 2014). Soon protests and demonstrations began to grow in Kiev 
around the popular square of Maidan and very quickly ramped up in size and intensity. 
This, along with the pro-EU sentiment of the protests led to the movement gaining its 
namesake (Diuk, 2014). What started as a protest of a few hundred and eventually 
thousands of students, became a nationwide movement after Yanukovych ordered the use 
of extreme force on protestors unlike anything the country had seen before. It is estimated 
that nearly 700,000 Ukrainians took to the streets on December 1st of that year, and by the 
end of February 2014 Yanukovych had fled the country and a new government had been 
installed. Spurned by the loss of a friendly government, Russia soon put the soft-power 
techniques on the back burner and began preparations for “setting events in motion that 
led to the annexation of Crimea” (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014, pg. 248). Tensions in the 
region had reached a boiling point, and it was now time for Russia act in the way they 




Once preparations were made and action was taken, things began to move very 
quickly. Following the expulsion of President Yanukovych from Ukraine, pro-Russian 
demonstrations began in the Crimean city of Sevastopol on February 23rd. By the 27th of 
the same month, masked Russian troops with no insignia took over the Crimean 
parliament (Weaver, 2015), and began to take over strategic sites all over Crimea. This 
led to an eventual referendum of the Crimean people on March 16th simply asking the 
choice between 2 options: “Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as 
a subject of the Russian federation?” and “Do you support the restoration of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as part of 
Ukraine?” (Grant, 2015, pg. 68-69). However, a declaration of independence for Crimea 
was already adopted on March 11th. Following the referendum, the Russian Federation 
Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights posted an analysis on their 
website estimating between 50-60% in favor of the first option on the referendum, and 
that at least 30% but no more than 50% of eligible people voted (Grant, 2015). However, 
the official tally that was reported ended up saying 96.77% were in favor of the first 
option, and that 83% of eligible voters voted. There is a clear disconnect here, but in any 
case by this point Crimea was already clearly in Russia’s hands militarily. The 
“referendum” that was conducted contains many questions regarding its validity, but it is 
much more important as a tool for understanding how Russia attempted to justify its 
annexation of Crimea on the world stage. 
Russia was able to take Crimea so quickly and successfully due to a plethora of 
reasons. Many of which can be seen when looking at the history of relations between 
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Russia and Ukraine, and the groundwork that was laid long ago. First, and arguably most 
importantly, was the military aspect. The 1997 deal that allowed Russia to have bases in 
Crimea gave them the advantage of already having an active military force in the region. 
This, coupled with the geography of Crimea being very far away from Ukraine’s capital 
alongside their already weak military, allowed for Russia to take Crimea in an extremely 
quick and efficient manner with basically no resistance. The aspect of receiving little 
resistance is a result of the complicated ethnic identity of Crimea, which contains a large 
number of ethnic Russians. Also of note here is Crimea’s former history as a Russian 
subject, and the neo-Stalinist policies of Russia in the 2000’s that brought about nostalgia 
for these times among many people in Crimea. The sham referendum of March 2014 was 
not for Russia, but to attempt to provide some legal basis for the annexation to the West. 
Russia already controlled the region politically, militarily, and to a large extent, 
culturally. This, in tandem with all the rich history of the region mentioned above, shows 
why a purely legal approach to solving Crimea is “blind to many important (non-legal) 
aspects of a conflict” (Feldbrugge, 2014, pg. 96). For this reason, it is vital that when 
approaching suggestions for a solution in Crimea we take into account the history and 









Analysis: Section II 
A Geopolitical Lens 
In the modern, hyper-globalized world states with vastly different sets of values 
interact more than ever before. To be able to properly understand how and why states 
interact in the way that they do, and hopefully reach solutions to international crises, it is 
crucial to adopt a more holistic perspective. One field of study that is useful for this is 
Geopolitics. Geopolitics can be defined as “the examination of interactions between 
political processes and geographic spaces in which these processes take place” (Csurgai, 
2019, pg. 4). Rather than being understood as a separate social science, geopolitics aims 
to incorporate various methods of analysis that exist within multiple fields of social 
science. These can include factors such as history, culture, economics, geography, human 
geography, and others. Whereas popular monocausal theories such as realism and 
Marxism view problems through the lens of generally one issue, in this case military 
strength and economics respectively, geopolitics aims to take a step back and view issues 
from a wider angle. 
In order to attempt to solve a dispute with the rich history and contention of the 
crisis in Crimea, this type of geopolitical perspective is necessary. The reason for this is 
that it gives a more nuanced look at the goals of the actors involved. Another main aspect 
of geopolitics is its focus on understanding the ‘strategy of actors’ (Csurgai, 2019). By 
broadening one’s perspective to see the issue from a multitude of viewpoints, it can be 
much easier to begin to propose viable solutions. This is felt particularly in the case study 
of Crimea, where realistic solutions coupled with the requisite historical background are 
vital for moving towards a resolution. 
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In the following three subsections, three possible solutions will be presented for 
solving the situation in Crimea. Positive and negative aspects of each solution will be 
weighed, and their viability seen through a geopolitical lens. This section will serve to 
illuminate the varied possibilities for a resolution, and lead to a conclusion that suggests 
the best path forward. 
Proposed Solution I: Unilateral Action 
The first possible resolution to the situation in Crimea would mean going down 
the current path that is being taken and at the same time doubling down on it as the only 
option. This path is one of unilateral pressure on Russia to cede Crimea back to Ukraine 
through international pressure, sanctions, and non-recognition of Crimea as Russian.. 
This tactic is currently the most popular, but its effectiveness for a peaceful solution in 
the long run is questionable.  
The positive aspect of this strategy is sanctions without a doubt hurt Russia. It is 
argued by some that sanctions themselves are not enough, and while that can be debated 
at length, Dr. Karel Svoboda of Charles University in Prague notes that sanctions make 
things legitimately difficult for Russia, and that they have consequences. When asked 
how he sees the view that sanctions mean little to Russia, Dr. Svoboda says, “it’s 
nonsense”. This view has proven to be true, as history shows that sanctions are always 
extremely harmful for the GDP of the target country (Giumelli, 2017). This fact has led 
many scholars to argue that continued sanctions and unrelenting pressure on Russia are 
the best way to move forward towards a resolution. One of these scholars is Dr. Jan Šír, 
also of Charles University. Dr. Šír argues that unilateral sanctions towards Russia is the 
best policy, as well as the important factor of non-recognition. The policy of non-
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recognition means that states refuse to recognize Crimea as belonging to the Russian 
Federation. This makes it very difficult for Russia to coordinate things in Crimea and 
allow people to live normally there because of the state of ‘legal limbo’ it is perpetually 
in. The logic behind this thinking is that with continued, unrelenting pressure through 
these mediums Russia will eventually have to relent and give up. However, it is naïve to 
think it will be this easy, so it is necessary to examine the drawbacks of such a plan.  
First and foremost, sanctions are never as cut and dry or one-sided as much of 
current political discourse suggests. Sanctions are basically war but in an economic sense, 
and war both militarily and economically is harmful for all parties involved (Giumelli, 
2017). Russia is a major trade partner with the EU especially in the field of oil, so 
exerting sanctions on a major partner is likely to hurt both parties. Studies found that in 
the time since EU sanctions on Russia began after the annexation of Crimea, imports and 
exports to and from Russia unsurprisingly decreased (Giumelli, 2017). By losing out on a 
solid chunk of trade with an important power, these statistics provide an argument for 
why sanctions are not the long-term answer for a solution. However, it is important to 
note that this same study also found that overall exports for EU countries has increased 
during this same time period due to an increase in exports to other countries (Giumelli, 
2017). So, while for now the EU seems to not have been hurt as bad in comparison by 
their imposition of sanctions, the very nature of Russia as a crucial trading partner brings 
into question the viability of unilateral sanctions in the long term. 
After analyzing the pros and cons of exerting unilateral sanctions and policies 
such as non-recognition as a possible solution, it is also vital to view the likelihood of this 
strategy’s success through a geopolitical lens. Geopolitically, the view that unilateral 
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action towards Russia is the only option is a very Western view that does not take into 
account the Russian perspective. This is because geopolitics focuses on taking a broader 
view that incorporates a multitude of perspectives. Regardless of who is “right” in a 
conflict, if a solution is ever to be reached there must be compromise and understanding 
from both sides. Going back to the Russian perception of being spurned by NATO and 
the United States after the withdrawal from the ABM treaty and eastern encroachment by 
NATO, it is unlikely that continued actions like this will lead to any sort of a solution. 
The geopolitical background of section I gave insight to the Russian mindset, and with 
this in mind, it is hard to imagine them ever conceding Crimea if there are no concessions 
from the other side. When seen from this view, another type of solution for Crimea is 
brought to mind that focuses more on cooperation. 
Proposed Solution II: Multilateral Incorporation 
After examining the positives and negatives of a unilateral pressure focused 
strategy, it is important to highlight a perspective that is more cooperation based. This 
method is one of multilateral incorporation. As a potential resolution strategy, 
multilateralism suggests a broader incorporation of Russia in European and international 
treaties and discussions. This is done in the hope that easing the tensions this way will 
lead to Crimea being resolved in a much less hostile way. However, as with any potential 
solution strategy, this comes with benefits and drawbacks. 
First, an undoubtedly positive aspect of multilateral incorporation is it is much 
more understanding of the Russian perspective. As discussed above, compromise is 
absolutely vital for an international agreement and multilateral incorporation leaves room 
for the softening of tensions in the region. A Europe that attempts to coexist with Russia 
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is likely to be much more prosperous than one that attempts to shut out a major power in 
the region. Even ignoring the economic aspect, European security and stability is 
influenced by Russia in a major way. Based on their history, a spurned and unhappy 
Russia is likely to lash out in a military capacity. It has even been argued that these exact 
“liberal delusions” of the success of unilateral policies are what provoked Putin and 
Russia to annex Crimea in the first place (Mearsheimer, 2014). Therefore, a multilateral 
approach that involves including Russia in Western security and economic treaties is 
likely to boost both the stability and economy of both parties, as well as ease tensions 
when approaching the topic of Crimea. Under this umbrella of multilateral cooperation 
from a security standpoint, Dr. Marc Finaud also has some suggestions for how this could 
play out. First, he suggests a restoring of military to military communication between 
Russia and EU member states. Also, adoption of measures to share information about 
troop movements. Legislation such as this promotes a healthy amount of discourse 
between Russia and the West as well as working to avoid another similar type of 
annexation due to the rapid troop movements used when taking Crimea. It would also 
serve to mitigate this “climate of mistrust” that Dr. Finaud discussed earlier. However, it 
may be this exact climate that makes the dream of multilateralism involving Russia an 
unlikely one.  
The main drawback of attempting a multilateral approach when resolving Crimea 
is that it assumes Russia wants to act in their own best interest and solve the situation. 
This is a problem with many political science theories: that they assume actors act 
rationally. A multilateral approach would also assume that Russia respects the rules of the 
game and the international system, but it can be argued the annexation of Crimea is all 
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the proof one needs to say that they do not respect the system. If Russia is suddenly 
incorporated into a wide array of multilateral treaties, who is to say that they do not jump 
ship the second they see something they do not like? Dr. Šír states that “Russia is 
unhappy with the rules” of the current system, and that their military-focused mindset is 
simply incompatible with the current make up of international relations. For this reason, 
he and many other scholars are extremely pessimistic about the prospects of a successful 
long-term union between Russia and the West. In the same vein Amanda Paul, leader of 
the Ukraine Forum at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, has even gone so far 
as to say, “Crimea will never be resolved”. This pessimism about Russia’s place in the 
modern international system is very common, and it makes it that much more 
complicated to predict what will happen next. 
Overall, multilateral incorporation is a resolution strategy that drastically differs 
from its unilateral counterpart. Focusing on cooperation rather than isolationist pressure, 
multilateralism seeks to bring about a solution via the easing of tensions between Russia 
and the West. When examined through a geopolitical lens, multilateralism’s viability is 
held up by the fact that it is more understanding of Russia’s perspective than 
unilateralism. History and geopolitics show us that diplomatic solutions cannot be 
reached without compromise, and multilateralism accounts for this. However, geopolitics 
also cautions one to view an issue in a realistic way that takes into account historical 
precedent and cultural attitudes. If multilateralism as a solution is viewed in this way, it 
would be easy for one to argue that there is no precedent that Russia would be 
cooperative in the current international system. For this reason, it is important to consider 
an additional possible resolution for Crimea: a shared sovereignty approach. 
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Proposed Solution III: Shared Sovereignty 
With both a unilateral and multilateral approach leaving something to be desired, 
it is necessary to examine the viability of a more unconventional resolution strategy. In 
this case, shared sovereignty. This would entail a system in which political 
responsibilities would be shared amongst multiple parties and allow for some sort of 
clarity to an essentially-contested zone.  
In the case of Crimea, a shared sovereignty approach would involve a sit down of 
both parties from Russia and Ukraine, and a hashing out of terms on what they each can 
control. These types of systems are predicated on the idea that both parties have 
something to gain from sitting down with one another, and in this case it would be the 
stability of the region. Both parties also believe they have an intrinsic right to the region, 
whether that is based on sociopolitical or historical grounds (Núñez, 2017), which makes 
the possibility of dialogue legitimate in this scenario. It is feasible to imagine a “one 
state, two systems” type of agreement if viewed through this lens, similar to what exists 
between China and Hong Kong. A concession of this sort would likely reduce hostility 
towards Russia in the international community and allow for the people of Crimea to stop 
living in this confusing legal in-between state.  
However, the prospects of this proposition happening are quickly shot down when 
the situation is viewed through a geopolitical lens. There is no compelling reason for 
Russia to concede to Ukraine in such a way, because as of right now they hold all of 
Crimea militarily. A dialogue such as the one proposed above is mostly a fanciful utopian 
ideal that does not seem to be in line with the way Russia operates. Unless this 
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hypothetical dialogue comes with an extra bargaining chip from Ukraine, it is unlikely 
that Russia would see any reason to sit down at the table.  
In summary, the proposition of egalitarian shared sovereignty is an 
unconventional suggestion for a resolution in Crimea and is important to the discussion 
surrounding the issue for this reason. If a real solution is to be reached, innovative and 
different ideas must be considered. While a geopolitical analysis would say that Russia 
would probably never agree to a system like this, it provides an important example of a 
different type of solution to Crimea. The 2014 annexation of Crimea was unlike any 
event that has been seen recently in the world of modern international relations, and the 
last 5 years have shown that simply unilateral pressure has not been enough to solve the 
crisis in the region. If one wants to resolve a truly unprecedented event, then a unique 
solution is required as well. In the case of Crimea, this would mean a synthesis of all 














In conclusion, the crisis in Crimea is an extremely complicated issue, and one that 
is largely unprecedented in the contemporary world of international relations. In order to 
adequately examine the issue and work towards a solution, it is necessary to research the 
topic in-depth and gain new perspectives. An extremely valuable tool for doing this can 
be done through geopolitical analysis. An interdisciplinary method of research combining 
multiple fields of study, geopolitics seeks to gain a wider understanding of international 
affairs. Notably among these fields are the ideas of culture and history. By examining the 
history of Ukraine, Crimea, and Russian-Ukrainian relations as a whole, geopolitics tells 
us that one can have a much more informed view of a problem when approaching 
resolution strategies from different perspectives. Three main strategies for a solution are 
at the forefront of this research: unilateral pressure, multilateral incorporation, and shared 
sovereignty. Based on the findings of this research, the best path forward is an 
incorporation of all three, with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation. Any single 
attempt to solve Crimea will be futile, because geopolitics shows that global political 
issues are complex and nuanced. Therefore, by incorporating the best aspects of the 
above three resolution strategies with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation, then the 
crisis in Crimea may eventually cease. 
Geopolitically, multilateral incorporation has the least amount of glaring flaws. 
This stems from the idea that the background information provided in Section I allows for 
a more nuanced look at the Russian perspective. For example, the idea that Russia’s 
perception of being betrayed by NATO and Western powers has led to their closed off 
approach and antagonistic behavior. Much of contemporary Western literature is 
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immediately critical of anything Russia does (Kropatcheva, 2012), and while this may be 
fair in some instances, if a solution is to be reached then all perspectives must be 
understood. An approach with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation would likely 
work best for making headway on a real solution because it is the friendliest to Russia. It 
can be debated ad nauseum whether or not Russia deserves to be invited back to the table 
because of their behavior, of if they would even come were they offered. But, this 
research is meant to offer an answer for the best route to an actual solution rather than say 
who is morally right and wrong. It cannot be denied that Russia broke a large number of 
international laws and precedents with their annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Burke 
White, 2014). For this reason, unilateral sanctions should still be instituted to a certain 
extent because this research shows that they definitely impact Russia. However, they 
should not be the only strategy. In addition, an attempt to find some sort of common 
ground between Russia and Ukraine, potentially rooted in cultural heritage, in a sort of 
quasi-shared system may be fanciful but not off the table. Overall, this paper is meant to 
showcase that there is no one single answer to an issue as complicated as Crimea. With 
the help of geopolitical analysis and a thorough understanding of the conflict, a solution 
can be proposed that may provide stability to the region. In this case, a solution that 
promotes understanding and cooperation through multilateral incorporation, as well as 
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ABM – Anti-ballistic missile 
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EPC – European Policy Centre 
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GCSP- Geneva Centre for Security Policy 
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